| Policy Considerations
One of the key issues that surrounds the
issue of species protection concerns the value
gained through protection. Specifically, "should a species be protected because
of the existing or anticipated benefit it provides to humans, or should it be saved
because it has a right to exist?" (Callan and Thomas 1996) The latter position
implies that the government will invest greater resources into protection programs, while
the former position allows for subjectivity in the decision to protect species.
Another key issue is that of property rights. Private property has always
been a prominent aspect of American life. In fact, James Madison, the main author of
the United States Constitution, originally wanted the trilogy of rights in the
Constitution to read:
"Life, and Liberty, with the fight of
acquiring and using property and general of and obtaining happiness and safety"
Of course, this was revised to the familiar
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness".
Additionally, in the Bill of Rights,
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Not surprisingly,
any governmental legislation that diminishes individual property rights is met with a
great deal of scrutiny and debate. In relation to Biodiversity, private property
rights (i.e. the right to develop one’s property) can present some significant
obstacles to implementing cohesive strategies for preserving biodiversity, particularly
for local and state governments.
Finally, the issue of equity:
many people prefer to protect today's biodiversity so that future generations (as well as
the present) may enjoy the many benefits. The same can be said of endangered species
protection. Because extinction is irreversible, some economists argue that
the costs of irreversibility should be included in the analysis of protection programs in
order to account for the loss of intergenerational equity.
Command
and Control Approach
- The Endangered Species Act is an example of
the command and control framework. Under this act, those who are regulated that do
not comply with the rules or standards specified by the control authority are faced with
substantial fines. The Secretary of Interior can impose civil penalties in the form
of fines for as much as $25,000 if an individual harasses, harms, pursues, hunts,
shoots, kills, traps, or captures species that are listed as threatened or endangered.
Additionally, the Attorney General can bring criminal charges and courts may impose
criminal penalties of up to $50,000 and one year in prison.
In the United States, command and control has historically been the main instrument for
regulation in general, and species protection specifically. In theory the Endangered
Species Act, is a feasible political option because it constitutes a legitimate interest
to most people by establishing a clear link between an endangered species and implementing
habitat conservation. Its reactive nature adds to its political feasibility but also
detrimentally affects it potency for preserving biodiversity. While it does have the
necessary requirements for success-- a component for protection of species and a component
for recovery--actual implementation of recovery plans is often too little too late at
best. In addition, species listing is often untimely and not always based on sound
science, but on political and social considerations.
Because of the dissatisfaction of the
effectiveness and timeliness of command and control efforts, many alternative methods of
achieving species protection and maintaining biodiversity have been put into practice.
The following are some examples:
Subsidy
Approach
Stewardship Incentive Program (SIP)
The Stewardship Incentive Program is one such
example of the subsidy policy tool that is in effect today. Stewardship Incentive
Program (SIP) is a program for private landowners who have an interest in the improvement
in their forest environment. The SIP program provides financial assistance to
enhance or improve the forest environment. SIP subsidies can help to improve soil
productivity, water quality, fisheries and wildlife habitat, timber resources, recreation,
and forest beauty. Of course, these are only a sampling of the activities that the SIP
helps to support.
The SIP improvements have three major
objectives:
- Improve, or restore, existing wildlife habitat
- Create new wildlife habitat
- Restore, protect, enhance, or maintain
endangered or threatened wildlife, plant communities, and their habitat
The SIP is a companion program to the Forest
Stewardship Program, which aims to improve the health and productivity of private forests.
SIP practices are administered through the Forest Stewardship Program with a
written plan outlining the landowners objectives and methods for reaching their
objectives. All SIP practices must be recommended in an approved Forest Stewardship
Plan before they can be implemented.
The Stewardship Incentive Program is a policy
tool for encouraging private citizens to take an active role in biodiversity conservation.
One of the reasons for providing an incentive for private parties to conserve is
that private land makes up the majority in the United States, and it is the land itself,
which provides the habitat for species, which must be conserved. The SIP provides a
market-based incentive for conserving land and restoring it (if necessary) to original
habitat. The incentive is a subsidy for reaching a given goal, in this case, land
conservation.
The program is voluntary and private
individuals, groups, associations, Native American Indian tribes, corporations without
publicly traded stock, and other legal entities that own from 10 to 1000 acres may qualify
for SIP assistance. A further benefit resulting from the SIP assistance is that in
some cases, ownership's of greater than 1000 to 5000 acres can also receive assistance
when "significant public benefit" would accrue. In these cases a waiver is
required.
There are some limitations to the program.
Firstly, SIP assistance many not exceed $10,000 per owner per fiscal year.
Secondly, Written approval must be granted by the U.S. Forest Service prior to
implementing a practice. Any land conservation or improvement practices that are
already required by federal, state, or local laws or regulations are not eligible.
The practices must be maintained for a minimum of 10 years and should be started with 18
months of approval.
In contrast to reactive methods of protection, the subsidy allows for proactive practices
to be implemented before endangerment occurs. This proactive approach is also
cost-effective relative to many reactive approaches because prevention is usually cheaper
than treatment. The subsidy is a politically popular instrument for achieving
certain policy goals because it does not have the command and control aspects of many
other methods associated with it. On the other hand, the general public may not
favor subsidies because of a general aversion to using their tax dollars for what they may
consider as non-legitimate programs.
Coasian
Bargaining/Contracts
Debt-for-Nature Swaps is a program where the
debtor government typically agrees to endow a conservation trust fund and/or set land
aside for preservation purposes, in exchange for cancellation of a debt.
Debt-for-nature swaps are designed to lower transaction costs and risks. These
contracts usually are structured to minimize the overall cost of risk bearing by
allocating risks to parties who can bear it most efficiently. There are little
specific details in these contracts because to do so would cost more than the benefit of
these transactions to both parties. However, this Coasian contract will attempt to
maximize value by mitigating monitoring, enforcement and dispute resolution costs.
The constraining factor is the degree of enforcement and the not the legal assignment of
the title, while completing ownership rights.
However, debt-for-nature swaps have been a
highly successful economic transaction, in the race to preserve biodiversity. As of
December 1992, 23 private debt-fore nature swaps have been completed in 14 different
countries. Of the private organizations, Conservation International, The Nature
Conservancy and the World Wildlife Fund have been most active in countries such as Costa
Rica, Ecuador, the Philippines and Madagascar.
The face value of the debt retired in private
swaps was $95.1 million, and the acquisition cost was $24.6 million. Eleven public swaps
cut debt by $904.5 million, which has generated conservation funds of $181 million.
Combining public and private transactions the
trades have involved 19 debtor countries and 1,460 billion debt. The total external
debt outstanding of developing countries stood at $1.34 trillion as of 1990.
Source: Deacon, et. al., "The Structure
of an Environmental Transaction: The Debt-for-nature Swap" Land Economics February,
1997 vol. 73, no. 1 pp. 1-24.
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